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Abstract This paper aims to contribute to the attempts to clarify and classify the
vague notion of ‘‘technosciences’’ from a historical perspective. A key question that
is raised is as follows: Does Francis Bacon, one of the founding fathers of the
modern age, provide a hitherto largely undiscovered programmatic position, which
might facilitate a more profound understanding of technosciences? The paper argues
that nearly everything we need today for an ontologically well-informed episte-
mology of technoscience can be found in the works of Bacon—this position will be
called epistemological real-constructivism. Rather than realist or constructivist,
empiricist or rationalist, Bacon’s position can best be understood as real-construc-
tivist since it challenges modern dichotomies. Reﬂection upon the contemporary
relevance of Bacon could contribute to the expanding and critical discussion on
technoscience. In the following I will reconstruct the term ‘‘technoscience’’. My
ﬁnding is that at least four different understandings or types of the term ‘‘techno-
science’’ co-exist. In a second step, I will analyze and elaborate on Bacon’s epis-
temological position. I will identify central elements of the four different
understandings in Bacon’s work. Finally, I will conclude that the epistemology of
technoscience is, indeed, very old—it is the epistemological position put forward by
Bacon.
Re ´sume ´ Cet article vise a ` contribuer aux tentatives de clariﬁer et de classiﬁer la
notion vague de «technosciences» a ` partir d’une perspective historique. La question
cle ´ souleve ´e est la suivante: Francis Bacon, un des pe `res fondateurs de la pe ´riode
modern, fournit-il une position pragmatique en grande partie non de ´couverte qui
pourrait faciliter une compre ´hension plus approfondie des technosciences? L’article
J. C. Schmidt (&)
Unit of Social, Culture and Technology Studies,
Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences,
Haardtring 100, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
e-mail: jan.schmidt@h-da.de
123
Poiesis Prax (2011) 8:103–124
DOI 10.1007/s10202-011-0104-zpre ´sente l’hypothe `se que pratiquement tout ce dont nous avons besoin aujourd’hui
pour e ´piste ´mologie ontologiquement bien informe ´e de la technoscience peut e ˆtre
trouve ´ dans les travaux de Bacon. Cette position sera appele ´e le constructivisme
e ´piste ´mologique re ´el. Pluto ˆt que re ´aliste ou constructiviste, empiriste ou rational-
iste, la position de Bacon peut e ˆtre comprise le mieux en tant que constructivisme
re ´el dans la mesure ou ` elle remet en cause les dichotomies modernes. Une re ´ﬂexion
sur la pertinence contemporaine de Bacon pourrait contribuer a ` l’e ´largissement et la
discussion critique de la technoscience. Ci-dessous, je vais reconstruire le terme
«technoscience». L’aboutissement de ma re ´ﬂexion consiste dans le fait qu’au moins
quatre compre ´hensions ou types du terme «technoscience» coexistent. Dans un
second temps, je vais analyser et e ´laborer la position e ´piste ´mologique de Bacon.
Enﬁn, je vais conclure que l’e ´piste ´mologie est, en effet, bien ancienne—c’est la
position e ´piste ´mologique mise en avant par Bacon.
Zusammenfassung Dieser Aufsatz mo ¨chte zu einer Kla ¨rung des Begriffs
,,technoscience‘‘ beitragen. Dazu wird eine historische Perspektive gewa ¨hlt.
Zentrale Frage ist: Ko ¨nnte nicht einer der Va ¨ter des Projekts der Moderne,
Francis Bacon, einen grundlegenden Ansatz liefern, um den Begriff ,,tech-
noscience‘‘ differenziert versta ¨ndlich zu machen? Dieser Aufsatz mo ¨chte zeigen,
dass alles, was wir fu ¨r eine ontologisch wohlinformierte Erkenntnistheorie der
,,technosciences‘‘ beno ¨tigen, sich im Kern in den Arbeiten Bacons im fru ¨hen 17.
Jahrhundert ﬁndet. Bacons Position ko ¨nnte als epistemologischer Real-Kon-
struktivismus oder Real-Konstruktionismus bezeichnet werden. Insofern er
moderne Dichotomien hinterfragt, passen die klassischen Kategorien—Realismus
oder Konstruktivismus, Empirismus oder Rationalismus—nicht mehr. Im Fol-
genden soll der Begriff ,,technoscience‘‘ rekonstruiert werden. Es wird gezeigt,
dass mindestens vier unterschiedliche Versta ¨ndnisweisen koexistieren. In einem
zweiten Schritt wird Bacons erkenntnistheoretische Position untersucht. Vier
zentrale Aspekte ko ¨nnen herausgestellt werden. Schließlich sollen diese beiden
Gedankenga ¨nge zusammengefu ¨hrt und dargelegt werden, dass Bacons Erkennt-
nis- und Wissenschaftsprogramm heutzutage weit verbreitet ist. Das heute so
scheinbar aktuelle Programm ist damit alles andere als neu; es ist jenes Pro-
gramm, das zu Beginn der Moderne von Bacon aufs Gleis gesetzt wurde.
1 Introduction
Bacon is back—perhaps he has never been away! The physicist Michio Kaku sees
late-modern societies ‘‘on the cusp of an epoch-making transition, from being
passive observers of Nature to being active choreographers. The age of discovery in
science is coming to a close, opening up an age of mastery’’ (Kaku 1998, 16f). The
program of intervening, manipulating, constructing, and creating is central to
technoscience. Technosciences—such as recent converging technologies (CTs): the
synergistic combination of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology,
and cognitive science (NBIC)—aim to enable a fundamental constructing and
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1 In NBIC both technological reductionism and
technological constructivism are uniﬁed (Schmidt 2004). A technoscience-based
‘‘improvement of human performance’’ is considered desirable as well as feasible
(Roco and Bainbridge 2002).
Ian Hacking’s emphatic call for a Back-to-Bacon movement has obviously turned
into reality (Hacking 1983).
2 Today’s technoscience can be considered as a new tip
of the iceberg of the Baconian project of modern science and the modern age in
general.
3 Nothing is new and unknown—except some side effects. Nearly
everything can be found in Bacon’s work (cp. Krohn 1987). The seeds of
technoscience trace back to the origins of the project of the modern age—that is my
thesis. To be more provocative, we can draw a line from Bacon to present-day
technosciences.
4
Bacon’s implicit omnipresence today is, indeed, rather surprising. In the 1980s
and 1990s, philosophers and sociologists diagnosed an ‘‘end of the Baconian age’’
(Bo ¨hme 1993). Scientiﬁc and technological progress can no longer be equated with
societal and human progress. Environmental problems emerged, revealing the
ambivalence of science-based technology: silent spring, acid rain, the hole in the
ozone layer, and global change problems. Severe accidents—occasionally labeled
‘‘normal catastrophes’’—have occurred: Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Challenger,
Bhopal, Sandoz, Exxon Valdez. Even earlier, in the early 1970s, the Club of
Rome released a ﬁrst study on Limits to Growth and challenged the Western way of
life. Hans Jonas argued for a heuristic of fear, a prevention principle, and a new kind
of imperative of responsibility (Jonas 1984). In the 1980s, Bacon’s worldview of the
technoscientiﬁc power to change the world and his political metaphysics were
1 Either directly or by harnessing autonomous self-organizing and self-producing processes, molecular
(soft!) machines and engines of creation.
2 The Bacon Renaissance is supported by the so-called New Experimentalism and the philosophical
(re-)discovery of things, material entities, objects. Until the 1980s, philosophers disregarded or, at least,
devaluated engineering and technical sciences—only in the materialist and pragmatist tradition do we ﬁnd
work on Bacon. Particularly outstanding is John Dewey’s approach and his concerns about the
predominance of idealist-dichotomist epistemologies. More recently Ian Hacking aimed to ‘‘initiate a
Back-to-Bacon movement’’ with his book Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983, 150):
‘‘Philosophers of science constantly discuss theories and representation of reality, but say almost
nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’’ (ibid, 149). Bacon
advocates a view of nature and of science that Hacking describes as follows: Bacon ‘‘taught that not only
must we observe nature in the raw, but that we must also ‘twist the lion’s tail’, that is, manipulate our
world in order to learn its secrets’’ (ibid, 149). Hacking elaborates on what he calls the ‘‘Baconian topics’’.
However, Hacking does not distance himself in any way from the big intervention approach of modern
science. We do not ﬁnd any critique in Hacking’s work. In line with Hacking’s entity realism is the
instrumental realism of Don Ihde, who complained that ‘‘Bacon has often been overlooked’’ (Ihde 1991,
63). Much earlier, in the 1970s, the Starnberg Group (C.F.v. Weizsa ¨cker and others) developed the
ﬁnalization theory in order to underline the external orientation of science—also with reference to Bacon
(Bo ¨hme et al. 1983).
3 Also encompassing reﬂexive modernity (which, certainly, is not always a reﬂective modernity).
4 There is a continuous history of Bacon’s program, visions and ideas (no epochal break with regard to
the program). Arguably, Bacon’s ideas might in former times have been regarded as merely
programmatic visions that were only partly fulﬁlled—e.g., the steam engine is not Baconian, it was a
result of technical non-scientiﬁc craft-knowledge, whereas today his visions seem to have been realized to
the full extent.
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crystallization point and the addressee of severe critique for the various side effects
of science, enlightenment and modernity in general: as Baconianism.
5 Positively
and negatively, Bacon’s impact on modern sciences (and the modern age) is
documented by the extensive history of Bacon’s reception. Kant, most notably,
ascribed the ‘‘revolution in ways of thinking’’ to none other than Bacon in the
preface to his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1989). In Kant’s famous and
militaristic words, Bacon had opened up ‘‘the highway of science’’ (in German:
Heeresweg der Wissenschaft).
The idea of this paper is to show that reviewing Bacon might serve to foster and
substantiate the technoscience discourse. Bacon’s implicit prevalence and relevance
in the world of today has, it would appear, largely escaped notice. The provocative
suggestion made by this paper is that a little more ‘‘materialism’’ would be very
helpful to epistemology, to cope not only with the taciturnity of nature, but also with
the harshness of day-to-day reality: technology, economy, society, life situations,
working worlds, technological consequences (cp. Feenberg 2002; Frodeman et al.
2010; Ihde 1991). The objective is to argue toward a political philosophy of
technoscience (cp. Rouse 1987). Referring to ideas and arguments expressed in the
works of contemporary scholars,
6 I ask: Does Francis Bacon provide a hitherto
largely undiscovered programmatic position which might facilitate a more profound
understanding of technosciences and technoscientiﬁc politics, in particular of nano-
technoscience (cp. Nordmann 2008; Hackett et al. 2008, 26)?
In the following (2), I will reconstruct the term ‘‘technoscience’’ and some lines
of the debate on technoscience in order to provide a reference frame for the further
investigation. My ﬁnding is that at least four different understandings or types of the
term ‘‘technoscience’’ are widespread. (3) In a second step, I will analyze and
elaborate on Bacon’s epistemological position. I will identify central elements of the
four different understandings in Bacon’s work. (4) I will then conclude that Bacon’s
program is prevalent in the technoscience discourse: An epistemology of
technoscience is, indeed, very old—it is an epistemology put forward by Bacon.
2 Technoscience
Besides Gilbert Hottois (1984) and Bruno Latour (1987), Donna Haraway forged
the term ‘‘technoscience’’:
7 ‘‘The world-building alliances of humans and
5 The general ambivalence of the Baconian project of modernity was, in fact, already questioned a few
decades ago by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in their Dialectics of Enlightenment
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). Concerns regarding Bacon’s worldview were raised particularly in the
1970s and 1980s; critics accused Bacon of advocating a commanding-conquering view of nature, an
instrumentalist concept of knowledge, and a naive linear-optimist model of science-based technological
progress as the driving force for societal-human progress.
6 Hacking (1983), Latour (1987, 1990), Rouse (1987), Cozzens and Gieryn (1990), Haraway (1991),
Bono (1995), Feenberg (2002), Radder (2003), Ihde and Selinger (2003), Nordmann (2005, 2006, 2008),
Smith and Schmidt (2007), and Zittel et al. (2008).
7 In addition, Ihde (2003), Weber (2003), Nordmann (2005, 2008) and others advocate the term
‘‘technoscience’’ to describe the historical transformation in the ‘‘culture of science’’.
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ity, action and passion, inside and outside in ways that enfeeble other modes of
speaking about science and technology. In short, technoscience is about worldly,
materialized, signifying and signiﬁcant power’’ (Haraway 2003, 43).
That is, of course, not a deﬁnition. What ‘‘technosciences’’ really are, is hard to
tell. The term is incredibly complex (Weber 2003; Nordmann 2005, 2008). As yet,
‘‘technoscience’’ remains an unspeciﬁed umbrella term. The lack of clarity,
however, is not regarded as a sign of insufﬁcient effort: The complex term
‘‘technoscience’’ seems to mirror an inescapable, complex technoscientiﬁc world.
That is why the term is considered to elude any attempt at ﬁnding a clear
deﬁnition—a perfect negative dialectic. This non-determinability seems to ﬁt very
well with the intentions of those who are engaged in the discourse. Their point of
departure is the perception that traditional boundaries, well-established categories,
and presupposed dichotomies are becoming blurred or have always been blurred,
e.g., the boundaries between science, technology and society, between natural and
engineering/technical sciences, between biology and technical systems, between
theory and practice, between nature and culture, between the given and the
fabricated, between autonomy and algorithmicity, between eternal facts and human-
made values, between science and politics, etc.
8
Strikingly, the technoscience discourse evokes major topics widely discussed
under the label of ‘‘deconstructivism’’ and, more provocatively, of ‘‘postmodern-
ism’’ in the 1980s. At that time, the hot topics were about the blurring or dissolution
of the boundaries considered as constitutive cornerstones for the self-understanding
of the modern age. Accordingly, the term ‘‘technoscience’’ extends the postmod-
ernist discourse and brings a fresh ﬂair of postmodernism to the fortress of science
and technology. Granted, it might be less provocative to speak about late, reﬂexive
or second modernity and to omit the term ‘‘post’’; even so, this does not alter the
actual content.
Whatever the reasons for the lack of clarity surrounding the term ‘‘techno-
science’’, we are witnessing an ongoing debate on the essential content.
9 Most
signiﬁcant is the question of whether or not we can draw a line between sciences
and technosciences, or between technoscience and engineering sciences. In other
words, does an epochal break and historical transformation from science to
technoscience take place? Or, in contrast, has science always been a kind of
technoscience, implying that there is no historical shift? In the latter case, we can
deconstruct and criticize the oversimpliﬁed and mystiﬁed self-understanding of
science of being pure and value-free that has been supported by scientists and
philosophers of science for various reasons. Both arguments remain somewhat
vague on what can be regarded as criteria for the diagnosis of a transformation or
not: Is there a differentia speciﬁca?
8 For instance, the STS scholar Sergio Sismondo regards ‘‘technoscience’’ as a concept that underlines
that ‘‘scientists and engineers are separated only by traditional boundaries’’ (Sismondo 2005, 59).
9 However, the indetermination of this term seems to be part of the structure, character and politics of
technoscience itself: we lack an adequate terminology.
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shouldbeassigned.Doestheterm‘‘technoscience’’refertothediscourseortoreality?In
other words,is thediscourse ontechnosciencemerelya discourseonthewayofseeing,
perceiving and talking about present-day science and technology—a discourse on the
discourse and on the rhetoric? Is ‘‘technoscience’’, then, to be considered a term of
reﬂection?Or,incontrast,does‘‘technoscience’’refertotechnoscientiﬁcpractice,tothe
technoscientiﬁc objects, knowledge types, and methods?
10
These questions are far too big to be addressed here and, also, they are far too
fundamental to allow a simple straight-forward answer. What I will attempt to do is
reduce the heterogeneity of ‘‘technoscience’’. My aim is to develop a reference frame
that will enable the technoscience discourse to be related to Bacon’s epistemology,
also in order toprovidea critique of the recent predominance ofBacon’s view and the
relatedpractices.Iwillshowthat‘‘technoscience’’hasapluralityofmeaningswithout
a unifying semantic core. I will also refer to Alfred Nordmann’s list of criteria of
‘‘technosciences’’(Nordmann2005,2008).
11Methodologically,Iwillusedistinctions
thataremostcommonin(traditional)philosophyofscience.Atleastfourheuristically
distinguishable,butinterlacedunderstandingsareonthetable.Thosewhoputforward
thenotionof‘‘technoscience’’donotneedtosubscribetoallfourunderstandingsorall
four types of technoscience thesis; selecting one is sufﬁcient.
2.1 Motives, interests, purposes, and power
Technoscienceisnotregardedasavalue-freeenterprisethatisseparatedfromsociety.
On the contrary, technoscience is governed by societal and economic interests,
purposes and goals. Technoscientiﬁc knowledge production carries a functionalist
(ﬁnalist, teleological, strategic, and instrumentalist) dimension. It aims to provide
knowledgenotasanend-in-itselfbutasameans:technoscientiﬁcknowledgeaspower
to change the world. According to Donna Haraway, ‘‘technoscience is about […]
signiﬁcant power.’’ (Haraway 2003, 43) Knowledge is developed from a technical
perspective, from the context of application and implementation, far beyond the
traditional demand-pull view.
12 In addition to both—the context of discovery and the
context of justiﬁcation—the context of application—knowledge generated in
‘‘broader, transdisciplinary social and economic contexts’’—turns out to be central
to technoscience (Gibbons et al. 1994, 4): Mode II knowledge production is nothing
but technoscience. Neither scientists nor philosophers can pretend that this
instrumentalisttypeofknowledgeispureandvalue-free.
13Theinternalistperspective
10 Another point might be added: How are these two aspects interrelated: does the rhetoric determine the
future state of science and society? A further question is what should the discourse achieve—a mere
description or a normative assessment of present-day and/or future technologies?
11 Nordmann identiﬁes various ‘‘symptoms for the change of culture from science to technoscience’’
(Nordmann 2005, 215).
12 According to Gibbons et al. (1994, 5), knowledge is ‘‘not developed ﬁrst and then applied to the
context later by a different group of practitioners.’’
13 Thus, knowledge is not seen as an end-in-itself, but rather as a combination of means-to-an-end and
end-in-itself. Knowledge is to be considered as both truth and utility—the latter as a way of changing,
shaping and manipulating given reality and constructively creating new realities.
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other hand are interlaced.
14 Technoscientiﬁc knowledge is assumed to be, in the long
run,anadequateinstrumenttoobtainacompetitiveadvantage intheglobalmarket,to
ensuregrowthandwealth,andtosolvesocietalproblems.
15Insofarasinterestsarethe
starting point of technoscience, the culturally well-established dichotomy between
facts and values is blurred at the very beginning of technoscientiﬁc practice. The
technoscience thesis also emphasizes the dominance of science in present-day
societies. Our societies are knowledge or science societies. A scientiﬁcation takes
place, in particular a scientiﬁcation of technology and of society in general. A good
example is nano-technoscience. Nano-technoscience is, on the one hand, based on
cutting-edge natural sciences. On the other hand, its motive is ‘‘to improve human
performance. [… Nano-technoscience as the core of] converging technologies could
achieveatremendousimprovementinhumanabilities,societaloutcomes,thenation’s
productivity, and the quality of life—a turning point in the evolution of human
society’’ (Roco and Bainbridge 2002).
2.2 Method, practice, process, and action
Technosciences—and modern sciences—depend heavily on instrumentation and
experimentation, on intervention and construction. The technical basis has been
stressed by the New Experimentalism and the older Methodological Constructivism:
‘‘We observe objects or events with instruments. The things that are seen in
twentieth-century science can seldom be observed by the unaided human senses.’’
(Hacking 1983, 168) Without intervening, shaping and manipulating, a scientiﬁc
methodology does not exist. Considering experimentation and intervention means
framing science or technoscience from an action-theoretical perspective: as process
and practice, including various actors and actants in different or ‘‘converging’’
epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina 1999; Kastenhofer 2007). Science makes and
fabricates knowledge, science creates and constructs facts. Bruno Latour uses ‘‘the
word ‘technoscience’ from now on, to describe all the elements tied to the scientiﬁc
contents no matter how dirty, unexpected or foreign they seem […].’’ The focus is
on the ‘‘activity of making science and not the deﬁnition given by scientists or
philosophers of what science consists of’’ (Latour 1987, 174). According to actor-
network theory and ‘‘relational materialism’’, technoscientiﬁc knowledge appears to
be socially and technically constructed. The context of discovery, construction and
creation—in contrast to the traditionally highly esteemed context of justiﬁcation
with respect to propositions, laws, and theories—is in the focus. This focus is
adopted by the ethnographic researchers who claim to open the (Pandora’s) black
14 STS scholars, in line with some Critical Theorists, underscore that facts and artifacts are political
(‘‘artifacts have politics’’, Winner 1980) and that there is not an essentialist difference between politics
and epistemology. According to this view, epistemology is part of the power discourse; in the classic STS
terms: ‘‘Truth speaks to power’’ and v.v.
15 Technoscientiﬁc knowledge is highly esteemed. For instance, Technology Assessment (TA) might
also be framed as a certain type of technoscience.
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16 The more in detail we look at the sciences or
technosciences, the greater the heterogeneity becomes—revealing a disunity
(Galison and Stump 1996; Knorr Cetina 1999, 2). Non-reducible non-knowledge
is most prevalent (Wehling 2006). The age of big narratives with mono-causal and
uniﬁcation-oriented explanations appears to be over. Technoscientiﬁc action seems
to be much more complex and cannot be decontextualized. Nano-technoscience, for
example, is highly dependent upon instruments and experiments—and it also
generates instruments. A breakthrough did not occur until the 1980s with the advent
of the Scanning Tunneling and Atomic Force Microscope. The same holds for
computation and simulation technologies underlying nearly all branches of
technosciences.
2.3 Objectivity, evidence, and truth
It seems to be a common view of those who are engaged in the technoscience debate
that the theoretical justiﬁcation and empirical evidence of scientiﬁc theories is—if it
existsatall—apointofminorimportance.Theoriesdonotguaranteeobjectivity,since
the thesis of underdetermination holds:
17 theories are underdetermined by empirical
data.Forthisreasonthetechnoscienceproponentsraiseconcernsaboutclassicnotions
of objectivity, including a theory-centered approach to truth. The classic position of
representational epistemicrealismischallengedandlargelyrejected.Althoughsocial
and cognitive constructivism continues to attract interest by the advocates of
‘‘technosciences’’, alternative positions such as action-oriented intervening realism
(Hacking 1983) or instrumental realism (Ihde 1991) are highly acknowledged. They
provide a materialist grounding and aim to keep in touch with our technoscientiﬁc
reality—a position that is not very far from Dewey’s pragmatism. In addition, actor-
network theory conveys implicitly realist assumptions to some extent (Sismondo
2005,72).BrunoLatour,forinstance,arguesthatapresent-dayconstructivismshould
also focus on the construction of things and material forms. ‘‘A little bit of
constructivismtakesyoufarawayfromrealism;acompleteconstructivismbringsyou
back to it.’’ (Latour 1990, 71) And Donna Haraway underlines in a provocative way:
‘‘To be a construct does NOT mean to be unreal or made up; quite the opposite’’
(Haraway2003,46).Thequestion‘‘ConstructionofWhat?’’(Hacking1999)therefore
includes the construction of material things. An epistemological materialist real-
constructivism seems to underlie the technoscience discourse.
18 These explicit
commitments to a realist stance—surprisingly also partly present under the big
umbrella of constructivism—show that it is not necessary to abandon any kind of
objectivity. However, objectivity is not related to explanations based on a reliable
theory; the deductive-nomological model of explanation is far too theoretical and far
too narrow. On the contrary, objectivity in the realm of technoscience is given via the
16 STS scholars ﬁnd context-dependent and situated practices of science in action. Their laboratory/ﬁeld
studies and their (de)constructivist approach reveal a broad variety of plural, multi-faceted and complex
phenomena that resist any uniﬁcation (Hackett et al. 2008).
17 This is also inherently linked with the classic induction problem and the Duhem-Quine thesis.
18 The position of ‘‘real-constructivism’’ is, as yet, not broadly perceived and discussed.
110 Poiesis Prax (2011) 8:103–124
123constructed new phenomenon, the built thing, or the produced object itself. In other
words: evidence of knowledge emerges immediatelyfrom objects, things, and works:
as the truth of things. The mere existence of the object represents the truth. Alfred
Nordmann discerns a ‘‘collapse of distance between representation and its objects’’
(Nordmann2006).DavisBairdforgestheterm‘‘thingknowledge’’,contrastingitwith
theoretical knowledge (Baird 2004). Truth is constructed with, by and within the
objects; it is demonstrated by capabilities to change what is given. To paraphrase
Hacking: If you can construct it, it’s true. According to Hacking, construction should
be considered as the central statement of ‘‘realism’’. Facts and artifacts, reality and
constructivity, theoretical, and technical, as well as truth and object existence,
knowledge and power are interlaced.
19 The well-established dichotomy between
theoryandpracticeisblurred—itprobablyneverexistedandwasonlyapowerfulself-
stylization.Nano-technoscience,forinstance, manifests its truthin the molecular plot
of the letters ‘‘IBM’’. In consequence, scientiﬁc truth is not veriﬁed by a new
theoretical concept of the nanocosm or a theoretical explanation, but by the created
(new) nanoobject itself. In this kind of validation, images also play a major role in
producing and showing the evidence and objectivity; the objects themselves are
mostly invisible.
20
2.4 Ontology and objects
Thequestionconcerningtheontologyofthetechnoscientiﬁcobjectsthemselvesisthe
most challenging. What kinds of things are constructed and createdin technoscience?
Their ontology is not clear at all; for example, are they nature or technical systems?
21
Technicalsystemsappeartobeandbehavelikenature.Theyhavewithinthemselvesa
principleofmotion(i.e.,change) and ofstationariness(i.e.,cessationofchange),they
grow like life and like an organism; in fact, they are also living organism. Traditional
boundaries, well-established categories and dichotomies that are still omnipresent in
thelife-worldarebecomingblurredorhavealwaysbeenblurred,e.g.,betweennature,
technology, and culture. Technology is regarded as being (bio-)naturalized and
culturized, nature is culturized and technologized, culture is technologized and
scientiﬁcized, etc.
22 In order to perceive and argue for hybridization, one has to
presuppose an Aristotelian concept of nature as phenomenological nature: the
19 It should be noted that technology and technical systems have never been mere instruments or just the
external applications of science; means and ends have never been ‘‘ontologically’’ different.
20 John Ziman’s concerns that the disappearance of traditional academic sciences, including the
paradigm of objectivity and fact-based dialog, will have unwanted consequences for democracy itself
seem important to be considered here (Ziman 2000). Until now, Ziman argues, science—even if the
actual practice might have been different—has served as the paradigmatic ideal of an argumentation-
based, power-free discourse.
21 This is the point of departure for the extended debate on the issue of: what does ‘‘nature’’ and
‘‘technology’’ mean in this context?
22 Technology is naturalized: Technology is not—as Aristotle maintained—con-/anti-nature. However,
technology is what is possible according to nature. Nature is law-like. For instance, the core of
technoscientiﬁc systems is governed by nothing but the laws of nature. Nature and the laws of nature have
been seen as identical since the very beginning of modern science. Therefore, scientiﬁc knowledge is to
be considered central to the construction of technical systems.
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and not from humans in the way technology does. Inspired by her ethnographic
vision of a Cyborg anthropology, Donna Haraway follows the trails across the
culturally established borders and depicts the various entanglements: cyborgs,
hybrids, test-tube embryos, transgenetic organism, in vitro fertilization, egg
donation, artiﬁcial insemination, surrogacy and human cloning. Haraway
‘‘attempt[s] to reﬁgure provocatively the border relations among speciﬁc humans,
other organisms, and machines. […] I call that ﬁeld site the culture and practice of
technoscience’’ (Haraway 2003, 43). In a similar vein, Karin Knorr Cetina
‘‘suggest[s] that this expression [of ‘‘molecular’’ or ‘‘cellular machines’’] can serve
as a master analogy for the ontology of objects in the laboratory: the objects that
stand out are not used as organism, they are implemented as machines’’ (Knorr
Cetina 1999, 149). Knorr Cetina explicitly uses the term ‘‘ontology’’ that formerly
has been a major signiﬁer of metaphysics and natural philosophy. Traditional
questions about nature emerge in the horizon of technoscience, such as: What is
Nature in the age of technical production, reproduction and self-production? Time-
honored terms, such as Nature, have obviously become blurred and do not provide
orientation in the life-world. A hybrid ontology, emerging with the objects, is
perceived; Nature is undetermined and, possibly, undeterminable. Nano(bio)tech-
noscience is, again, an excellent example that has inspired the discourse about the
ontology of technoscientiﬁc objects. Some nanostructures have the capability of self-
organization and self-assembly into highly complex systems. In ‘‘Engines of
Creation’’, K. Eric Drexler (1990) presents a highly disputed futurological version of
self-organization and bottom-up emergence. Nanobots, aka molecular assemblers,
are considered the constituents of soft, or molecular, machinery, including molecular
fabrication based on autonomous self-organization.
23 Nature itself is seen to be
productive and constructive; the German idealist Schelling spoke about ‘‘Nature as
Productivity’’ and natura naturans. This holds for all technonatural hybrid objects.
Boundaries are becoming blurred and giving rise to a hybrid ontology: Technical
systems are (bio-)naturalized, whereas conversely (bio-)nature is technologized.
2.5 Conclusion
The list is not exhaustive. But it may provide at least some clarity regarding the term
‘‘technoscience’’, at the same time highlighting a plurality of meanings. The list will
subsequently serve as a reference frame for the further investigation of Bacon’s
epistemology. The overarching feature and common denominator of the four types
of technoscience is the recognition that well-established categories and presupposed
dichotomies are becoming blurred or have always been blurred. Whether we can, or
should, re-establish the categories is at issue. Ulrich Beck and Christoph Lau, for
23 According to Drexler, the self-productivity of nano-assembly could serve as the basis for an
engineering revolution in the fabrication of complex systems—leading to a new renaissance and a next
industrial revolution of soft machines. ‘‘Assemblers will be able to make anything from common
materials without labor, replacing smoking factories with systems as clean as forests’’ (Drexler 1990).
Tiny gears, motors, levers, casings, and proteins, genomes, mitochondria, cells, organs will be produced
by molecular tools in processes of self-organization.
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boundaries: Without boundaries, societal life is not possible (Beck and Lau 2004).
24
To summarize, four different types of technoscience thesis are found in the
present debate: motive-/purpose-technoscience, practice-/method-technoscience,
truth-/objectivity-technoscience, and ontology-technoscience. Those who promote
the term ‘‘technoscience’’ do not need to subscribe to all four types or
understandings simultaneously. Acknowledging the recent prevalence and relevance
of technoscience requires that at least one of them be supported.
25 Not everybody
will agree to all of the above-mentioned types of technoscience. Underlying
political or philosophical convictions will determine which of the four types one
might consider as the most important and which of them will simply be viewed as
inferences or mere consequences. For instance, one may defend truth-/objectivity-
technoscience or ontology-technoscience and, at the same time, consider practice-/
method-technoscience as a semantically empty term that lacks justiﬁable criteria.
3 Bacon’s epistemology in recent technoscience
It is remarkable that all four different types of the technoscience thesis elaborated
above turn out to be quite old. In fact, the origin of the technoscientiﬁc program can
be found in the programmatic work of Francis Bacon (cp. Krohn 1987; Whitney
1989; Scha ¨fer 1999). Although most present-day epistemologists and philosophers
do not refer explicitly to Bacon—though many historians and sociologists worked
on Bacon’s account of modernity—his epistemology in particular deserves more
attention (cf. Schmidt 2007, 2011). Nearly everything we need today for a
materialist epistemology can be derived from a review of the epistemic program put
forward by Bacon—a position I tentatively call epistemological real-constructivism,
a conjunction of realism and constructivism, including self-constructivism. The
term real-constructivism is also used by Siltala (1998) and Astington (2000),
obviously with different connotations. This position clearly differs from classic
cognitive constructivism or recent social constructivism. The classic dichotomy or
antagonism between constructivism and realism is sublated (‘‘aufgehoben’’ in the
words of G. F. W. Hegel), that is, preserved and eliminated. What is constructed,
24 The technoscience thesis does, indeed, advance a strong critique of traditional scientiﬁc (theory)
realism: In many respects, this kind of realism is revealed to be (nothing but) idealism. The technoscience
scholars seem to advocate a kind of materialism, but not a naturalism. In particular, Ian Hacking refers to
Bacon and to Marx (and his Feuerbach thesis): Not interpreting, but changing, the world is the goal
(Hacking 1983).
25 Cp. Wittgenstein’s family resemblance.
26 Real-constructivism will probably not ﬁt into any established dichotomy schema of epistemology, and
in particular will not succumb to a reduction to the cognitive-contemplative. Today, a real-constructivist
epistemology could be fundamental to a critical assessment of current technosciences, for example, nano-
technoscience. The guiding idea that will not be elaborated on in this paper is: ‘‘All questions of
epistemology are also questions of social order’’, as Latour writes (1999). Reﬂection on Bacon points to
ways of getting back to a critique—and focusing attention on the ambivalence of modernity, its ‘‘politics
of things’’ (Latour 1999; cp. Feenberg 2002) or the ‘‘technoscientiﬁc politics’’ (Hackett et al. 2008).
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26 To be a construct does not imply to
be not real (cp. Haraway 2003, 46).
Bacon’s claim at the beginning of the seventeenth century was not unpresump-
tuous: not only verbal knowledge, but intervention knowledge; not a cognitive-
contemplative interpretation of a given reality (traditional ‘‘Nature’’), but a
constructive altering and shaping of the world—precisely in the same tenor as the
famous Feuerbach thesis of Marx (cf. Farrington 1979). Knowledge and power are
siblings. With Bacon, the idea of a science-based transformation of a transformable
world emerges—reaching out in time and accessing the future: Man as homo faber
makes history; a regnum hominis is fostered by a scientia activa. Bacon’s stance as
presented in his Novum Organon (1620; cf. Rees and Wakely 2004)—the main
work of the famous, but unﬁnished Instauratio Magna (Great Renewal of the
Sciences)—reﬂects the pathos of an epoch breaker: there the old Organon of
Aristotle and here a new, viz. his own Organon; there the sunken Atlantis of Plato,
here his New Atlantis (cf. Bacon 1966). Bacon assumes that an experimental
philosophy for the future is both possible and necessary. Thitherto, however,
‘‘progress in the sciences’’ had been held back ‘‘by reverence for antiquity, for the
authority of those held to be philosophy’s great men and then by giving their
consent to all that’’ (NO I: Aph. 84). Only the characters of ‘‘master and pupil’’,
‘‘not of discoverer and improver of discoveries’’ had been brought forth (NO I:
15).
27 Instead of persisting in self-referential thinking, Bacon refers to active skills,
tinkering, knowledge and insights gained by craftsmen, doctors and seamen in their
(inter-)action with their environment (‘‘Nature’’). Traditionally, technical practice
was devalued. It was regarded as theoretically insigniﬁcant. By contrast, Bacon
believes that making and doing are fundamental, but also worthy and capable of
improvement. Therefore, technical capability should be paired with theoretical
knowledge; mechanics with physics. Bacon’s aim was to found, foster and facilitate
natural sciences and science-based technology. He delineated the new (techno-)
sciences as an inseparable combination of ‘‘light-bearing’’ and ‘‘fruit-bearing’’,
understanding and intervening, insight and impact.
It has to be conceded that the type of epistemology advocated by Bacon is not one
that focuses primarily on the theoretical, linguistic or logical conditions of the
possibility of theoretical knowledge. It was therefore not a type of epistemology that
attracted the attention of traditional philosophers of science who mainly focus on the
law-based propositions and the uniﬁcation project of theoretical physics.
28 There
26 Real-constructivism will probably not ﬁt into any established dichotomy schema of epistemology, and
in particular will not succumb to a reduction to the cognitive-contemplative. Today, a real-constructivist
epistemology could be fundamental to a critical assessment of current technosciences, for example, nano-
technoscience. The guiding idea that will not be elaborated on in this paper is: ‘‘All questions of
epistemology are also questions of social order’’, as Latour writes (1999). Reﬂection on Bacon points to
ways of getting back to a critique—and focusing attention on the ambivalence of modernity, its ‘‘politics
of things’’ (Latour 1999; cp. Feenberg 2002) or the ‘‘technoscientiﬁc politics’’ (Hackett et al. 2008).
27 Bacon extends this critique of the ‘‘human authorities’’ of ‘‘antiquity’’ (NO I: Aph. 84) into an early
form of critique of philosophy and ideology—as part of his epistemology. In his famous doctrine of
‘‘idols’’ (NO I: Aph. 38ff) Bacon attempts to show how uncertain notions, false judgments and circular
systems of thought arise through the reference to authorities.
28 Bacon’s program is, in fact, a theory of science in society, see Cozzens and Gieryn (1990).
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123were,ofcourse,exceptions,suchasthepragmatistsandinparticularJohnDewey,who
300 yearsafterBaconchallengedthephilosophersinsimilarwords:‘‘Thedevaluation
of acting, making, and fabricating has been cultivated by the philosophers.’’ (Dewey
2001/1929, 8) In light of the foregoing, I will now present and discuss a list of four
dimensions of Bacon’s materialist concept of knowledge—his real-constructivism—
that,strikingly,coincidewiththefourunderstandingsoftechnoscience;wecanusethe
words ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘technoscience’’ interchangeably.
3.1 Interests, motives, and purposes
For Bacon, knowledge is not just an end-in-itself, but above all a means-to-an-end
(instrumentalism): for further knowledge, for deeper truth, for better instruments
and technical systems, for a more efﬁcient control and changing of nature, even for
a regnum hominis (cf. Krohn 1987;S c h a ¨fer 1999). According to Bacon, ‘‘the true
and legitimate end of the sciences is nothing other than to supply human life with
new discoveries and resources’’ (NO I: Aph. 81) that ‘‘may, to some degree, subdue
and mitigate their needs and miseries.’’ (NO I: 37) For this new kind of knowledge,
Bacon holds that ‘‘human knowledge and power come to the same thing’’ (NO I:
Aph. 3). He believes that the new, active science is positively utilizable in its very
core and could be beneﬁcial to all. Therefore, ‘‘the end […] for this science is not
the discovery of arguments but of arts’’, in particular of technology, techniques and
technical systems (NO I: 29). The different objectives of the old and new science
lead, Bacon holds, to ‘‘different effects. For one aims to beat an opponent in debate;
the other to bend nature to work’’ (NO I: 29), the latter in order ‘‘to command [the]
things’’ (NO I: Aph. 29). Bacon is not, however, given to non-theoretical tinkering
with direct utility, as he saw in Leonardo and the artist-engineers of the
Renaissance. He believes they went about their work aimlessly, governed by
‘‘hazard’’, randomness, and trial-and-error rather than by methods (NO I: Aph. 8).
The ‘‘fruit-bearing knowledge’’ which Bacon is aiming at presupposes—initially—
to some extent ‘‘light-bearing’’ knowledge, meaning a ‘‘discovery of causes’’ (NO I:
Aph. 99). ‘‘Causes’’ in this context are not limited to an understanding in the sense
of epistemic realism, but can also be regarded from an instrumentalist perspective.
Knowing the causes is necessary in order to learn and advance ‘‘the art of
discovering’’ (NO I: Aph. 130), in other words, ‘‘to discover something to enable
everything else to be rapidly discovered by means of it’’: an ars inveniendi (NO I:
Aph. 129). This meta-discovery program—the discovery of the logic of discovery—
may be regarded as the core of Bacon’s approach.
29
29 If the source of societal progress lies in the investigation of nature, as Bacon believes, society has an
interest and claim in science. An active science requires division of labor and a strong institutional-
ization—that is to say: suitable general conditions of good scientiﬁc practice. ‘‘For only then men begin to
know their own strength, when instead of countless men doing the same thing, some will be responsible
for some things, others for other things.’’ (NO I: Aph. 113) Bacon delivers a programmatic account of
cooperation based on the division of labor, such as was found in early capitalist manufactories, in his
utopian narrative ‘‘New Atlantis’’. ‘‘Salomon’s House’’—the scientiﬁc institution of New Atlantis—is not
a subordinate authority of the state ‘‘Bensalem’’; it is rather an autonomous institution. Scientists are free
to decide what is worth knowing. This institutional freedom guarantees light-bearing knowledge and, in
consequence, the most fruit-bearing one.
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free from value and interest. Rather, it aims at light-bearing and fruit-bearing utility
as a way of changing, shaping, and manipulating given reality and creating (or self-
creating) new realities. Knowledge is regarded from the purposive perspective of
problem-solving and utility, power and politics.
3.2 Method, practice, action and the context of discovery and construction
For Bacon, intervention is not just an end, but also the means for obtaining
knowledge. The core of scientiﬁc investigations is methodology, i.e., the experiment
(NO I, Aph. 119), including the instruments (‘‘instrumenta’’; NO I, Aph. 2), and the
construction of an artiﬁcial reality. Knowledge is attained neither by random trial-
and-error or technical tinkering, nor by passive observation or pure thinking, but by
a systematic process of experimental production and technical activity: Man ‘‘does
and understands only as much as he has observed by work [in nature …]; beyond
this he has neither knowledge nor power’’ (NO I: 45). Bacon does not wish to ‘‘put
together a history of nature free and unconstrained (when, that is, it goes its own
way and does its own work […]) but much more of nature restrained and vexed,
namely when it is forced from its own conditions by human agency, and squeezed
and molded’’ (NO I: 39). The most appropriate practical action for learning about
(and from) nature, therefore, seems to be intervention, more speciﬁcally:
construction and creation. The experiment is (‘‘ontologically’’) appropriate to
nature, because nature per se tends to be taciturn and guards its secrets inside. A
passive observer’s perspective, which was later also criticized in the pragmatist’s
tradition by John Dewey (1929), is impossible according to Bacon: Achieving
knowledge is always an artifact-based operation on things, accompanied by the
construction of things, hence an act. Facts are rooted in actions, in facere (from
Latin for ‘‘to make’’).
30
What argument does Bacon provide in favor of the experiment? Bacon’s
argumentation is clearly anti-sensualistic: The sense ‘‘fails us’’; it ‘‘deserts’’ and
may‘‘deceive’’us(NOI:33).
31Onlytheexperimentcan,accordingtoBacon,provide
the answer.It leads away from the observer’s perspective to the actor’s perspective of
knowledge:Experimentingisanactionandaprocess.Theexperimentprovides,under
artiﬁcial conditions, control of the boundary conditions and the construction of
phenomena and things. The boundary conditions may be varied to ensure reproduc-
ibility (and reproduction) and to construct spatial, temporal and inter-personal
invariance. Stability and thereby regularity is established by human action.
Consequently, Bacon ‘‘set[s] little store by the immediate and peculiar perception
30 This calls the common modern dichotomy between ontology and epistemology into question. Bacon’s
and Dewey’s critique was, in principle, conﬁrmed by quantum physics and its measurement process in the
early twentieth century.
31 For instance, if the ‘‘minuteness of [a body’s] parts’’ or ‘‘its swiftness or slowness’’ dominates (NO I:
33), the human senses are overtaxed, making a transition from the ‘‘incommensurable to the
commensurable’’ infeasible (NO II: Aph. 8). Initially, the idea that it might be possible to reﬁne the
senses by means of instruments, for example a microscope, could occur. That, however, would only shift
the problem gradually—it is not sufﬁcient.
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experiment whereasthe experiment judges the thing.’’(NOI:35) Therefore, Bacon is
not a sensualistic empiricist—‘‘the sense’’ is not the ‘‘measure of things’’ (NO I: 35).
With that, the methodological foundation has been laid without yet having paved
the way to how knowledge is actually produced and how evidence is guaranteed. In
fact, the experiment is also central to Bacon’s ‘‘inductive method’’ (NO I: 31):
According to the latter, it is possible and necessary to ‘‘abstract both notions and
axioms from things by a surer and ﬁrmer way’’ (NO I: 31/Aph. 18/19)—induction as
experimental abstraction. However, ‘‘things’’ are not to be understood in a naı ¨ve-
realistic way, for instance as being simply given, which Bacon was accused of
doing. The thing itself becomes accessible, or is even constructed as such, as
something ‘‘new’’ (=productive function) in the experiment. In the 1980s, Andrew
Pickering spoke in a similar vein of the microphysical ‘‘construction of quarks’’
(Pickering 1984): Experiment therefore does not involve intervention only, but in
particular also construction or creation. Bacon tells us we should not pass from the
singular to the universal in a single step. Rather, it is important ‘‘to educe axioms
successively and step by step’’ (NO I: 31). Bacon’s type of induction (‘‘exclusion or
elimination theory of induction’’) includes a certain type of experiment-based
falsiﬁcationism: It proceeds by ways of ‘‘exclusions and rejections’’ (NO II: Aph.
18). In Bacon’s view, ‘‘men are allowed only to proceed by Negatives at ﬁrst’’ to
arrive at secure knowledge ‘‘after making every sort of exclusion’’ (NO II: Aph. 15).
So ‘‘every contradictory instance wrecks a conjecture’’ (NO II: Aph. 18).
32 Hans
Heussler refuted John Stuart Mill’s interpretation of Bacon as a logical inductionist
as early as in 1889, and argued against giving Bacon a ‘‘one-sided empiristically
biased label’’ (Heussler 1889, ii).
33
To summarize, the methodological kernel of real-constructivism has been
articulated: the experiment as mediation between empirical realism and active-
experimental constructivism. Reality also includes that which is constructed.
3.3 Objectivity, evidence, and the context of justiﬁcation
Knowledge is knowledge as long as it is progressing, developing, and advancing.
Bacon denies any kind of atemporal, eternal truth. He sees truth as being relative, in
32 According to Bacon, inductive method means a tentative interplay between exclusatory inductions,
experimental constructions and deduction. In this way, broader statements can be obtained successively.
By means of this method, science is ‘‘driven on, as it were, by a machine’’. In the nineteenth century,
Bacon’s accounts led some philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill, to discern in them only a contribution
to inductive logic—not to inductive methodology.
33 Heussler’s rationalist’s line of interpretation could be supplemented with an interventionalist’s, or
more speciﬁcally: a real-constructivist’s one. The inappropriateness of a mere inductivist interpretation is
also substantiated by Bacon’s prominent example of the bees, in which he contradicts both the
Renaissance engineers and pure empiricists and the school philosophers and rationalists. Bacon likens
experimentalists and empiricists to ‘‘ants’’ who merely ‘‘store up and use things’’; they are mindlessly just
gathering data. Rationalists, on the other hand, are like ‘‘spiders’’ that ‘‘spin webs from their own
entrails’’, e.g., they are spinning empty theories. Bacon’s ideal is the bee, which ‘‘takes the middle path’’.
The bee ‘‘collects its material from the ﬂowers of ﬁelds and garden, but its special gift is to convert and
digest it’’ (NO I: Aph. 95).
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123terms of the ‘‘daughter not of authority but of time’’ (NO I: Aph. 84). Bacon speaks
of ‘‘scientiﬁc advance’’ and ‘‘progress’’ in a way that will become typical for the
modern era. Science is research!
What, then, is true knowledge for Bacon? Truth is, in a double sense, not without
works and machinery. True knowledge is in the ﬁrst place one that is brought forth
on works—via technically based experiments—using the method of induction and
then presented in tables of laws. Since the artifacts are essentially based on (the laws
of) nature, the experimentally produced facts and things are nothing else but nature.
Secondly, true knowledge is one that manifests itself in works. Works are, Bacon
writes, ‘‘pledges [and guarantors] of the truth’’, they designate materialized
objectivity (NO I: Aph. 124): ‘‘Truth and utility are […] the very same things, and
works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the
comforts of life.’’ (NO I: Aph. 124)—Works therefore have a dual purpose for what
can be regarded as truth, that is to say, in both the genesis of truth and in the
manifestation of truth.
However, not only do works beneﬁt the truth—the reverse is also valid: Truth
serves as ‘‘new pledges of works’’ (NO I: Aph. 81). If the works fail, it is often due
to ‘‘ignorance of causes’’, to untrue knowledge (NO I: 45/Aph. 3): Truth is useful to
the production of a work or machinery; in addition, and more important, truth
manifests in works. For Bacon, this is not a circle, but an iterative, self-dynamizing
scientiﬁc process of work production and truth generation. Works and truth are
therefore more than closely related. Their spearheads are pointed at the phenom-
enally given nature, which has to be ‘‘conquered’’, ‘‘bent’’ and ‘‘constrained’’ (NO I:
29/Aph. 3); ‘‘Experience’’ and ‘‘judgment’’ should be ‘‘drawn from […] the very
innards of nature’’ (NO I: 33). Although the commonplace phrase knowledge is
power that has been ascribed to Bacon is not to be found in any passage of his
writings, kindred deﬁnitions are indeed present, for example when he writes that
‘‘those twin objectives, human Knowledge and Power, do in fact come together’’
(NO I: 45) and ‘‘human knowledge and power come to the same thing’’ (NO I: Aph.
3). The knowledge/power link is certainly not to be understood in a descriptive sense
only, but also in a normative one: Only that which is based on might and power, and
facilitates a command over nature should be considered as (valid) knowledge.T h i s
connection is ﬁrst expressed as a negation: Without knowing anything about nature,
that is, if the cause-effect relationships are ‘‘not known’’, the ‘‘effect’’ will be missed
and cannot be predicted—this lacks practical use for human purposes. Put in
positive terms: ‘‘that which in thought [=theoretical knowledge] is equivalent to a
cause, is in operation equivalent to a rule’’ (NO I: Aph. 3).
34 Vico later provided a
34 The term ‘‘rule’’ might misleadingly suggest a Humean kind of ‘‘rule following’’ in the sense of a
nomological succession of events—or a Newtonian trajectory of an oscillating body. That is not what is
meant by Bacon; for Bacon, rule signiﬁes an action rule or instruction: Whenever I wish to bring about an
effect Y, I must do X. In this respect, Bacon echoes in some degree the view of action theorists, for
example Georg Henrik von Wright (1971). Von Wright distinguishes between doing and bringing about.
Doing represents the speciﬁc action of man, viz. to posit causes and to set initial conditions, and thereby
to induce the regular succession of events in nature, whereas an intended effect, the brought about event,
results in and via nature, e.g., via trajectories based on Newtonian mechanics. In order to act intentionally
in nature, knowledge of the mechanism of nature is necessary; thus knowledge of nature becomes central
to the knowledge of action and production. Intervention and representation are mutually dependent.
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123celebrated formulation: Verum et factur convertuntur (cp. Dupuy 2005).
35
According to Bacon, man is even assigned the task of ‘‘writ[ing] a revelation
and true vision of the Creator’s footprints and impressions upon His creatures’’ (NO
I: 45). The religious motives of the modern era are hardly to be underestimated.
To summarize, in terms of evidence and validity, real-constructivism means
progressive manifestation of truth in (and through) works and machinery, therefore
through real-constructs. The things represent truth.
3.4 Ontology and objects
The above-described understanding of truth incorporates a speciﬁc conception of
nature. Bacon repeatedly rejects broad systems of natural philosophical
speculations and metaphysics; but even he cannot dispense with a pre-
understanding of ‘‘nature’’ (cf. Krohn 1987); a minimal amount of metaphysics
is indispensible. Bacon rejects Aristotle’s separation of technical systems or
technology from nature—and, therefore, conversely the separation of nature from
technology. His critique of the Aristotelian dichotomy represents a major
contribution to the foundation of the modern era. For Bacon, it is neither
necessary nor possible to outwit nature (and her rest and self-momentum) by the
action of craftsmen and man-made technology. Rather, technology is what is
possible within the framework of nature, whereas nature is described by the
(sociomorphism) ‘‘law’’ (‘‘the fundamental and general laws constitute the
forms’’ of the bodies; NO II: 5, cp. ‘‘axiomatum’’, NO I: 99)—and, therefore,
not by speciﬁc (outer) appearances of our life-world or our senses. Nature is
regarded as governed by mathematical laws. Thus, Bacon draws technology
under the wide umbrella of (nomological) nature and, in this sense, ‘‘naturalizes
technology’’. Technology is nothing but (possible) nature, governed by mathe-
matical laws; hence, it is impossible that technology is not in accordance with
nature (cf. Krohn 1987). Therefore, man—in order to build technical systems—
must be ‘‘servant and interpreter’’ of nature; he has to achieve knowledge about
nature and has to obey nature (NO I: 45/Aph. 1). By phrasing natura parendo
vincitur (nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed!), Bacon highlights
‘‘parendo’’ ﬁrst and then ‘‘vincitur’’. However, the kind of nature that Bacon
wishes to subsequently ‘‘vanquish’’ and ‘‘command’’, in order to reveal her
secrets and shape it, differs from the one he ‘‘serves’’ (‘‘parendo’’). The nature to
be commanded by means of technical instruments and tools is the type of nature
which confronts man as an alien force in his day-to-day life: phenomenal nature,
including, for example, the pest. In summary, (a) Bacon extends the
understanding of nature to all branches of reality, in particular to technology.
In this sense, he is a precursor for a naturalization of technology. (b) On the
other hand, nature has to be vanquished and shaped by means of technology; so
35 That might have irritated traditional religious lines: nature in the hand of man—is that not hubris? On
the contrary, Bacon believes: the intervention dimension of knowledge is even motivated and justiﬁed
from a religious perspective. Bacon speaks of God’s ‘‘ﬁrst fruits of creation’’ (NO I: 45) and goes on to
encourage the ‘‘imitation of God’s works’’ by the action of man: as a second creation. ‘‘Discoveries are
also like new Creations’’ (NO I: Aph. 129).
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nature. To foster the development of science-based technology, Bacon presup-
poses, entirely in accord with modern physics and late-modern technology, that a
lawful ‘‘union [=unity] of nature’’ as the ‘‘foundation for the constitution of
sciences’’ can ‘‘start to set up the sciences [=the project of modern sciences]’’
(NO II: Aph. 27).
36
We also ﬁnd a deeper elaboration on ontology of nature and (nature-appropriate)
methods/instrumental techniques in Bacon’s work. The understanding of nature
advocated by Bacon can be described as a reductionism to basic properties or to the
tiniest parts (NO II: Aph. 8), which Bacon assumes to be (ontologically) inherent in
nature. ‘‘For seeing that every natural action is carried out by things inﬁnitely small,
or at least too small to strike the sense, no one can hope to govern or change nature
until he has duly comprehended and observed them’’ (NO II: Aph. 6). For achieving
this goal of knowledge, Bacon needs to advance human access to nature: We should
proceed from the ‘‘entrance hall’’ to the ‘‘inner’’ of nature. ‘‘For as yet we are but
lingering in the outer courts of nature, nor are we preparing ourselves a way into her
inner chambers. Yet no one can endow a given body with a new nature, or […]
transmute it into a new body, unless he has attained a competent knowledge of the
body so to be altered or transformed.’’ (NO II: Aph. 7) To accomplish this, ‘‘we
shall be led [reduced] to real particles, such as really exist. […] the nearer it
approaches to simple natures, the easier and plainer will everything become; the
business being transferred from the complicated to the simple; from the
incommensurable to the commensurable; from surds to rational quantities; from
the inﬁnite and vague to the ﬁnite and certain; as in the case of the letters of the
alphabet and the notes of music.’’ (NO II: Aph. 8)
Interestingly, all this does not, however, exclude the self-activity of nature.
‘‘Nature’’ is capable of making something and acting ‘‘from within’’ (NO I: Aph. 4).
Bacon assumes a kind of productive self-creativity within (nomological, form-
based) nature and acknowledges the emergence of new properties and qualitative
aspects in the overall (form) transformation process of matter—in agreement with
Aristotle and in dissent with the mathematical laws of mechanics. In Bacon’s line of
argumentation, it would be just one tiny step forward to argue in favor of the
feasibility of technology-based creativity and self-assembly, as we ﬁnd in advanced
nano-technoscience (Drexler 1990).
In summary, from the perspective of natural philosophy, Baconian real-
constructivism claims that nature is nature insofar as it is governed by laws; nature
is nothing but mathematical law. On the other hand, there is a type of nature that is
36 Bacon also criticizes the Aristotelian Four Causes doctrine. Most prominently, he presents—what was
to become characteristic for modernity—a critique of the ﬁnal cause, which ‘‘is far from being beneﬁcial
that it actually corrupts the sciences’’ (NO II: Aph. 2). Finality, according to Bacon, is scientiﬁcally non-
perceivable; it is just metaphysics. After all, in nature ‘‘nothing really exists […] besides individual
bodies, carrying out pure, individual acts according to law, yet […] this very law, and the investigation,
discovery and explanation of it, is the very foundation […] of knowing as it is of operating’’ (NO II: Aph.
2). So Bacon already introduces an understanding of laws into the center of the new experimental natural
philosophy. The aim is to ﬁnd ‘‘the general and fundamental laws which constitute forms’’ (NO II: Aph.
5). Admittedly, the notion of form may still sound somewhat Aristotelian; but forms are reinterpreted as
underlying laws.
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123phenomenologically given. Technological artifacts and technical systems are not
unnatural or beyond nature; they are also, and in particular, natural reality insofar as
they are constructed. Furthermore, production is apparent in nature itself: Nature is
capable of constructing something.
It is remarkable that the four types of technoscience—remembering, of course, that
the term ‘‘technoscience’’ was coined subsequently, in the 1970s—can be found in
Bacon’s materialist epistemology: as epistemological real-constructivism. The main
ideas behind technoscience, in particular the real-constructivist program, trace back
to the origin of modern science in the early seventeenth century.
4 Conclusion and prospects
‘‘Clearly,’’ Hans Achterhuis states, ‘‘Bacon’s observation about the transforming
impact of technology, made at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is as topical
as ever.’’ (Achterhuis 2001, 2) From the programmatic perspective, certainly, there
is no epochal break. Almost everything can be found in the works of Bacon.
The objective of this paper was to underline the relevance and prevalence of
Bacon in today’s technoscience by identifying four common dimensions of the
discourse. Four different types of technoscience (thesis) are at the bottom of the
recent discussion: purpose-technoscience, method-technoscience, truth-techno-
science, and object-technoscience. Bacon was, indeed, a forerunner of a real-
constructivist materialist epistemology. In spite of Kant’s clear reference to Bacon
in the opening to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1989;
sadly, Kant has hardly been interpreted from a materialist point of view), Bacon’s
epistemology has been ignored and neglected by sociologists and philosophers of
science over the last few decades, although the reality and relevance of Bacon’s
epistemology today can hardly be denied and underestimated. Bacon has merely
been read from the science policy angle—advocating an externalist perspective on
science, not as an epistemologist. Today’s widespread (implicit!) epistemological
Baconianism poses challenges to philosophers and social scientists alike—and to
late-modern societies in general. To meet these challenges, it was an excellent move
by Gilbert Hottois (1984), Donna Haraway (1995), Bruno Latour (1987), Don Ihde
(2002), Jutta Weber (2003), and Alfred Nordmann (2005) to forge a new umbrella
term: ‘‘Technoscience’’ has been on the table since the late 1970s and extensively
discussed since the 1990s. For the present-day expanding discourse on techno-
science, a (re-)consideration of Bacon’s real-constructivism as well as of the history
of technoscientiﬁc epistemology might be fruitful.
37 The societal future of
knowledge will (and should) not be determined without reﬂection on its origin—
in order to strengthen or, at least, to preserve our critical faculties and powers of
37 Moreover, a speciﬁc Baconian real-constructivism might also be found in the diagnoses on the state of
current sciences—a point that has to be elaborated on elsewhere, for instance in theses on: New
Production of Knowledge/Mode 2, post-normal or post-academic science.
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123discernment. A discourse on Bacon could make a contribution in this respect: ‘‘For
any kind of critique of society a critique of knowledge is indispensable, and vice
versa.’’ (Adorno 1969,1 5 8 )
Therefore, reﬂecting upon the contemporary relevance and prevalence of Bacon
means creating a foundation for a critique. Only by considering the underlying
materialist epistemology of real-constructivism will we perhaps be able (a) to
develop a critical-materialist account of recent Baconianism and (b) to provide
alternatives to the predominance of materialist approaches and the commanding
theory of knowledge. This is a further task. It may turn out that we are not
inescapably doomed to Bacon’s real-constructivism and the power-based episte-
mology of technoscience (Bo ¨hme and Manzei 2003). However, this is another story
that needs further clariﬁcation and a new programmatic effort.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
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